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INTRODUCTION
It is said that a picture is worth a thousand words. However, is a
forty-three word Facebook post worth a possible Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) investigation? Since 2006, Netflix CEO Reed
Hastings has used his personal Facebook account to share everything from
YouTube videos to pictures of his children. 1 In keeping with his social
persona, Hastings has often used his Facebook page to share the
achievements of Netflix and its senior leadership.2 On July 3, 2012,
Hastings posted on his Facebook page: “Congrats to Ted Sarandos, and his
amazing content licensing team. Netflix monthly viewing exceeded 1
billion hours for the first time ever in June. When House of Cards and
Arrested Development debut, we’ll blow these records away. Keep going,
Ted, we need even more!” 3
While the post received 293 “likes” from the page’s followers,4 the
SEC had a less favorable reaction. On December 5, 2012, the SEC
launched a formal investigation into whether Hastings’s Facebook post
violated the commission’s Regulation Fair Disclosure (“Reg FD”)
requirements, which mandate that all investors have fair notice of when and
where a company will post material financial information. 5 The SEC
believed that Hastings’s post violated this requirement by posting a piece of
material financial information without making the rest of the investment
community simultaneously aware of the disclosure. 6 Suspicion of
improper disclosure only grew when Netflix’s share price rose significantly
in the days following the post. 7
1. See Reed Hastings, FACEBOOK (Dec. 15, 2011), https://www.facebook.com/
reed1960?fref=ts (showing a picture of his children playing in the snow); id. at Dec. 21,
2011 (providing a YouTube video advertising Samsung’s Smart TVs).
2. See, e.g., id. at Jan. 4, 2012 (stating, “Just 10 years ago, most people connected
over dialup. Today we announced that Netflix members streamed over 2 billion hours of
video from us in Q4. Hard to imagine what the internet [sic] will enable 10 years from now.
Very exciting.”); id. at Feb. 8, 2013 (remarking, “Great NYT Magazine spread on Ted the
Original Algorithm Sarandos, the guy who bet our farm on House of Cards.”).
3. Id. at July 3, 2012.
4. Id.
5. See generally Chris Isidore & David Goldman, Netflix Faces SEC Probe over
Facebook Post, CNN MONEY (Dec. 7, 2012, 12:18 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/12/07/
technology/netflix-facebook-sec/ (describing the general objectives of Reg FD
requirements).
6. See Halah Touryalai, Don’t Blame the SEC, Netflix CEO’s Facebook Post is
Questionable, FORBES (Dec. 7, 2012, 2:14 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/
2012/12/07/dont-blame-the-sec-netflix-ceos-facebook-post-is-questionable/ (explaining the
main issue underlying the SEC’s proposed investigation of Hastings’s conduct).
7. But see id. (describing how the increased stock price may also be attributed to a
favorable Citigroup research report that had been released on the same day as Hastings’s
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The possibility of an enforcement action over a social media post
prompted myriad reactions from the financial community.
Some
commentators focused on how disclosure of information to a large social
media audience is analogous to a press release.8 Others chided the SEC for
opening an investigation when, in the estimation of one analyst, “more
people saw Mr. Hastings’ Facebook post than have viewed any regulatory
announcement in corporate history.” 9 Even Hastings criticized the SEC’s
view that sending a message to 200,000 people, many of whom were
bloggers and reporters, could not be considered “public” disclosure. 10
Notably, the SEC changed course shortly after opening its
investigation. Instead of seeking an enforcement action against Netflix, the
SEC used the incident as an opportunity to revisit its disclosure
requirements. On April 2, 2013, the SEC published the first set of new Reg
FD interpretative guidelines since 2008. 11 Within these guidelines, the
SEC set new standards for when and how material financial disclosures
could be shared by companies and executives via social media. 12
While some praised the SEC’s decision to be a “government agency
that actually thinks innovation is a good thing,” 13 not everyone shared that
sentiment. For example, the SEC was criticized for adopting a policy that
invited more confusion than clarity. 14 Seventy-seven percent of CFOs and
investor relations professionals from major public companies believed the
SEC’s report provided inadequate guidance. 15 In the words of numerous
post).
8. See Abram Brown, Netflix CEO Reed Hastings’ Facebook Flap Forces SEC into
21st Century, FORBES (Apr. 2, 2013, 3:57 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/abrambrown/
2013/04/02/sec-enters-21st-century-approves-twitter-and-facebook-for-official-disclosures/
(noting that it took the SEC twenty minutes to tweet the new guidelines after posting them
on their web site).
9. Andrew Hill, SEC’s Ruling Won’t Make Many Facebook Friends, FINANCIAL
TIMES BUSINESS BLOG (Apr. 3, 2013, 11:42 AM), http://blogs.ft.com/businessblog/2013/
04/secs-ruling-wont-make-many-facebook-friends/.
10. Isidore & Goldman, supra note 5.
11. Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934: Netflix, Inc., and Reed Hastings, Exchange Act Release No. 69,279, [2012-2013
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 84,972 (Apr. 2, 2013) [hereinafter SEC Report
of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Exchange Act].
12. Id. ¶ 84,972-73.
13. Joshua Gallu, SEC Approves Using Facebook, Twitter for Company Disclosures,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 3, 2013, 11:23 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-02/secapproves-social-media-use-for-companies-material-disclosure.html.
14. See KCSA Strategic Communications, SEC Social Media Guidelines Still Unclear
for Investor Relations, KCSA (Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.kcsa.com/kcsa_news_
040413_2.php (noting that the vast majority of CFOs and investor relations professionals do
not think the SEC has given enough guidance on how to use social media to disclose
company information).
15. Id.; see also KCSA Strategic Communications, KCSA Strategic Communications
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attorneys in disclosure practices, when it comes to using social media
outlets for disclosure, their advice would be, “[d]on’t do it.” 16
Numerous articles and reports have discussed the complex compliance
issues created by these new guidelines. 17 While compliance is an important
part of deciphering the SEC’s view of fair disclosure, it is not the most
important or valuable inquiry stemming from this new report.
The SEC’s decision to publish these new interpretative guidelines was
not an accident. Since its inception in 2000, Reg FD has sought to create
an investment climate that promotes fairness through public disclosure. 18
The SEC and its leadership have long recognized that technology would
have a significant impact in shaping and defining what is “public” and
“fair” in the investment space.19 Even though the SEC’s social media
guidelines are an attempt to liberalize the flow of financial information to
investors, the Commission’s emphasis on fairness may actually chill the
use of technologies that best align investor interests with fair disclosure.20
In other words, the SEC’s emphasis on a 20th century definition of fairness
may not advance the interests of 21st century investors.
This comment seeks to explore how the SEC’s new social media
guidelines may actually harm investors by undermining the goals behind
Reg FD’s adoption. Even though it is important to address the challenges
Launches Investor Relations Social Media Index, KCSA (Dec. 11, 2013),
http://www.kcsa.com/kcsa_news_121113.php (discussing that initially only two companies
in the Fortune 100 had notified the SEC about an intention to use social media for
disclosures purposes as of the end of 2013).
16. Frances Denmark, New SEC Ruling Plays it Safe on Corporate Disclosure via
Social Media, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Apr. 29, 2013, at 35, available at
http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/Article/3197961/Banking-and-Capital-Markets/NewSEC-Ruling-Plays-It-Safe-on-Corporate-Disclosure-Via-Social-Media.html#.VEldlxYrfdl.
17. See e.g., Deborah S. Birnbach, R. Todd Cronan, Lisa R. Haddad & Michael T.
Jones, SEC Clarifies Social Media Use and Reg FD Compliance, GOODWIN PROCTER (Apr.
5, 2013), http://www.goodwinprocter.com/Publications/Newsletters/Client-Alert/2013/0405
_SEC-Clarifies-Social-Media-Use-and-Reg-FD-Compliance.aspx?article=1 (explaining the
multitude of compliance challenges created by the new guidelines).
18. See Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Opening Statement at
the Open Meeting on Regulation Fair Disclosure (Aug. 10, 2000), available at
https://www.sec.gov/news/extra/seldisal.htm (stating that Reg FD was promulgated to
further the core principles of integrity and fairness).
19. See Laura S. Unger, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Rethinking Disclosure
in the Information Age: Can There Be Too Much of a Good Thing? (June 26, 2000),
available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch387.htm (describing the inherent
uncertainties that come with the internet, technology, and disclosure).
20. See David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, The Board, Social Media and Regulation
FD, N.Y. L.J., March 28, 2013, at 5 (explaining, “[T]he societal value placed on
transparency and the immediate, widespread communication of material information to all
investors is no longer in question; the issue is only how best to implement regulation
supporting this value.”).
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these guidelines create for issuers and investors, 21 an equally important
issue to address is how the SEC’s shifting culpability requirements for
“fair” disclosure may hinder Reg FD’s mission of promoting trust and
providing open access to relevant financial information. To understand this
problem, I will first trace the SEC’s early conception of Reg FD policies.
Next, I will explain how recent guidelines are no longer in sync with
changes in the investment community. Finally, I will discuss the
implications of the SEC’s attempt to better align Reg FD with modern
conceptions of “fairness.”

I.

THE PURSUIT TOWARDS FAIRNESS: 2000 REG FD
GUIDELINES

A. Rhetorical Conceptions of Reg FD
The need for Reg FD arose from growing concern that institutional
investors had gained a strategic advantage in receiving relevant financial
information. Through insider conference calls and private conversations,
institutional investors and analysts received material financial information
before it became available to the public.22 Such practices led to a growing
concern that once this information actually reached the public, the
information would have already “resulted in a significant change in the
share price or higher than usual trading volume.” 23
Despite the problematic nature of this activity, then-existing securities
laws had not clarified when such trading behavior would be considered
illegal. 24 In response to these selective disclosure practices, then-SEC
Chairman Arthur Levitt stated in 1999, “[f]or over sixty years, our markets
have been a model for transparency and integrity.” 25 However, the “long
established precepts of financial reporting, and ethical restraint” had
21. See e.g, Alyssa Wansor, The Facebook Status that Sparked an SEC Investigation:
Regulation Fair Disclosure and the Growth of Social Media, 30 TOURO L. REV. 732, 744-55
(2014) (explaining how the indeterminacies in the new guidelines may actually create more
social media-related challenges than opportunities for investors and issuers).
22. See Fact Sheet: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading Rule Proposals, SEC. &
EXCHANGE COMM’N (Dec. 15, 1999), https://www.sec.gov/news/extra/sdiscfaq.htm (stating
that “[i]n many reported incidents, companies selectively disclosed important information –
such as upcoming earnings figures–in conference calls or meetings that are open only to
selected securities analysts and/or institutional investors, and which exclude members of the
public and the media.”).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at the Open
Commission on Audit Committee Oversight, Selective Disclosure, and Insider Trading
(Dec. 15, 1999), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/extra/alsdisc.htm.
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become compromised by this “emerging culture of gamesmanship within
the financial reporting process.” 26 Levitt believed that such gamesmanship
compromised the vision that, as a nation, “we pride ourselves on having the
purest form of meritocracy in the world” and therefore “ground ourselves
in a trust that, through equal opportunity, everyone has a chance to
succeed.” 27
In reaction to challenges to these historical premises, the Commission
became “increasingly concerned” that “[t]hose privy to selectively
disclosed information have an unfair advantage over other investors.” 28
Chairman Levitt analogized the state of the investment market to a
“neighborhood with gated entrances and tall fences.”29 To counteract this
problem, Levitt viewed Reg FD as a tool to bring “all investors, regardless
of the size of their holdings, into the information loop—where they
belong.” 30 He wanted all American investors to know that it was “well past
time to say, ‘Welcome to the neighborhood.’” 31
B. Creating a Distinct Enforcement Area
Despite the novelty of these practices, Chairman Levitt claimed,
“Regulation FD was not intended to be revolutionary.” 32 Instead, the
regulation as proposed had been “clearly drafted to change behavior and to
end practices that were universally regarded as unfair.” 33
The SEC began by identifying the target audience for Reg FD. The
Commission did not envision these requirements as a tool for policing
communications within the broker-dealer community. 34 Instead, the SEC
wanted the “responsibility for avoiding selective disclosure, and the risks of
engaging in it, [to fall] squarely on the issuer.” 35 However, even though the
regulation “focus[ed] primarily on communications between issuers and
analysts,” investment bankers also had responsibilities in the disclosure
equation. 36

26. Id.
27. Levitt, supra note 18.
28. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 22.
29. Levitt, supra note 18.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Richard Walker, Director, Division of Enforcement, SEC, Speech by SEC Staff:
Regulation FD –– An Enforcement Perspective (November 1, 2000), available at
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch415.htm.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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Therefore, to regulate this activity, the proposed Reg FD policy had
two primary requirements. 37 First, “whenever an issuer intentionally
discloses material information, it [must] do so through public disclosure,
not through selective disclosure.” 38 Second, “whenever an issuer learns
that it has made a non-intentional material selective disclosure the issuer
[must] make prompt public disclosure of that information.” 39 Under the
proposed guidelines, the “public disclosure” requirement would be satisfied
by filing information with the SEC, through a press release, or by
“providing public access (for example, by phone access or webcast) to the
conference call or meeting.” 40 Chairman Levitt explained that if a
company made an “unintentional selective disclosure,” they would be
obligated to make that information known to the public “in short order.”41
C. Critical Reception and SEC Reaction
During the comment period, the SEC received 6,000 letters, mostly
from individual investors expressing their interest in fairer market
practices. 42 During this process, there had been discussion that the SEC
lacked enough evidence about selective disclosure problems to justify a
new rule. 43 The SEC’s head of enforcement, Richard Walker, countered
that complaints about Reg FD’s “far-reaching effects on disclosure
practices” indicated two realities: (1) that selective disclosure had been
more widespread than originally thought and (2) that retail customers faced
even steeper disadvantages as a result of the previously allowed practices. 44
The most common concerns of Reg FD critics focused on the
possibility “that these rules will ‘chill’ the flow of information as
companies respond by providing less disclosure altogether.” 45 However,
Chairman Levitt envisioned that the guidelines would “provide issuers with
a great deal of flexibility in the way they distribute information––including
the use of new technologies over the Internet to offer extraordinary broad
access at minimal cost.” 46 Despite pushing for these higher standards,
Levitt hedged his claims by explaining that “[w]hile these rules don’t

37. SEC, supra note 22.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Levitt, supra note 25.
42. Press Release, Sec. & Exchange Comm’n, Commission Votes to End Selective
Disclosure (August 10, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/endseldi.htm.
43. Walker, supra note 32.
44. Id.
45. Levitt, supra note 25.
46. Id.
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require this, I strongly urge corporate America to open up your conference
calls to all investors. Place them on the Internet. The basic principle of
fairness deserves no less.” 47
In the face of these complaints, the SEC sought to clarify that “there is
no need for fear or hysteria, and you should not let the securities bar
convince you otherwise.” 48 He clarified that the new regulations had not
been “designed as a trap for the unwary, as many law firms are
counseling.” 49 For example, he cited how the “express language” of the
regulation did not seek liability for failure to make a required public
disclosure. 50 Instead, a violation would only exist if an issuer “acted
recklessly or intentionally in making a selective disclosure.” 51 Such a
violation would not occur if the issuer simply incorrectly determined the
materiality of a certain piece of information.52 Instead, such an omission
would need to “represent an ‘extreme departure’ from standards of
reasonable care” in order to reach the level of a Reg FD violation.53
To address the “chilling effect,” the SEC explained that “any such
effect being observed is largely due to an over-abundance of caution, fed
by the dire predictions of numerous law firms and others opposed to the
rule.” 54 To protect against any “chilling effect,” the Commission set out to
make it “crystal clear that Regulation FD will not cover communications
with the media, or ordinary-course business communications with an
issuer’s customers or suppliers.” 55 The SEC’s head of enforcement,
Richard Walker, rebuffed claims of “overzealous” enforcement efforts by
explaining that “[t]here will be no FD SWAT Teams.” 56 On the contrary,
he believed that “second guessing reasonable disclosure decisions made in
good faith, even if we don’t agree with them,” would “frustrate the purpose
of the rule.” 57 In addition, the SEC did not intend “to test the outer limits
of the rule by bringing cases that aggressively challenge the choices issuers
are entitled to make regarding the manner in which a disclosure is made.” 58
Instead, he expressed confidence that increased experience with these
provisions would allow issuers to “become increasingly comfortable with

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Walker, supra note 32.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Levitt, supra note 18.
Walker, supra note 32.
Id.
Id.
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its requirements” and therefore “adjust their practices in conformity with
the rule.” 59
D. Adaptability of the Original Reg FD Policies
As a result of the public comments, the SEC made a series of changes
that narrowed the scope of the proposed regulation. 60 For example, the
SEC decided that the regulation would only apply to issuer
communications with the following groups: (1) marketing professionals
and (2) “holders of the issuer’s securities under circumstances in which it is
reasonably foreseeable that the security holders will trade on the basis of
the information.” 61 The regulation would not be applicable to “issuer
communications with the press, rating agencies, and ordinary-course
business communications with customers and suppliers.” 62 The SEC also
lessened the scope of the regulation by explaining that it would only apply
to communication from the issuer’s senior management team. 63 Perhaps
most interesting is the SEC’s hedging language that the revised Reg FD
requirement “does not impede legitimate business communications or
expose issuers to liability for selective disclosure arising from arguable but
mistaken judgments about the materiality of information.” 64
E. The Envisioned Future of Reg FD Policies
While Reg FD had largely been a reaction to unfair selective
disclosure practices in the past, the SEC simultaneously recognized that it
could not ignore how communication technology would adapt the
applicability of these practices. The emergence of the Internet at the turn
of the 21st century led SEC officials to believe that “it is the responsibility
of this and successor Commissions to continually evaluate the impact of
laws and regulations on our markets and seek ways to adjust in an
increasingly competitive global environment.”65 When Chairman Levitt
stepped down in 2001, his temporary successor, Laura Simone Unger, took
over the Commission at a time when communication technology was
rapidly changing both the investment market and the savvy of investors
themselves.
59. Id.
60. Fact Sheet: Regulation Fair Disclosure and New Insider Trading Rules, SEC. &
EXCHANGE COMM’N (August 10, 2000), https://www.sec.gov/news/extra/seldsfct.htm.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Levitt, supra note 18.
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During this period, Unger described how a majority of her time as
Commissioner had been spent “speaking about the impact of the Internet on
investors and the securities markets.” 66 She viewed the Internet as “rapidly
eroding the informational advantages formerly enjoyed only by big players
in the markets” and this had resulted in “breaking down barriers to
individual investors’ participation in offerings and the corporate
governance process.” 67
As a result of these changes, she recognized that the SEC would soon
need to tackle the question of, “what investors will do with the truckloads
of information.” 68 To answer this question, Unger believed that the SEC
would need to dig deeper to answer several other different, yet correlated
questions. These questions included, “[w]ill the Internet deliver timely,
relevant information to make investors more knowledgeable or will it be
more like a dump truck depositing information that overwhelms and buries
them?” 69 Despite these more nuanced inquires, Unger felt that perhaps the
most important question underlying all of these changes would be “whether
average investors really want and need the level of information provided to
professionals.” 70
Despite these challenges, Unger envisioned an information
marketplace where “an informed investor will become a more involved
investor.” 71 She assumed that the future investor would be “cyber-savvy
and have online brokerage accounts.” 72 While she believed that not every
investor would take advantage of this information, she assumed that most
would. 73
Unger also viewed communication technology as a tool that would not
only shape the knowledge base of investors, but also alter the dynamic
between investors and financial institutions. She viewed the Internet as a
tool that would allow investors to both critique company decisions and help
“unify their voices when there is a particular matter of concern.”74 Perhaps
most prophetic was her belief that the SEC would need to “look beyond
[its] traditional role of mandating specific company disclosures to
determine what other information may help investors make meaningful
voting and investment decisions.” 75 While she “unequivocally” shared her
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Unger, supra note 19.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Unger, supra note19.
Id.
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predecessor’s goal of “curbing selective disclosure,” she predicted that
certain proposals which aimed to give consumers more information may
have the opposite effect.76
II.

LIBERALIZING DISCLOSURE: 2008 REG FD INTERPRETIVE
GUIDELINES

Despite many of Unger’s prophecies about the impact of
communication technologies on disclosure practices, the SEC did not
substantively revise its Reg FD guidelines until 2008. Within these new
guidelines, the SEC addressed how “[o]ngoing technological advances in
electronic communications have increased both the markets’ and investors’
demand for more timely company disclosure and the ability of companies
to capture, process and disseminate this information to market
participants.” 77 Such guidance had been “expected” due to “the speed at
which technological advances are developing, and the translation of those
technologies into investor tools.” 78
A. Impact of the Internet on Disclosure Expectations
Much of the 2008 interpretative guidelines addressed how the Internet
changed the way investors located disclosure information. The SEC
explained that the Commission “long recognized the vital role of the
Internet and electronic communications in modernizing the disclosure
system under the federal securities laws and in promoting transparency,
liquidity and efficiency in our trading markets.”79 For that reason, the
Commission “believ[ed] that the Internet has helped to transform the
trading markets by enabling many retail investors to have ready access to
company information.” 80
Such changes in the financial information marketplace necessitated
the SEC’s acknowledgment of both the Internet’s impact on disclosure
practices and the growing prominence of company web sites as the
epicenter of financial information. Under the new interpretive guidelines,
the SEC acknowledged that “there has been a dramatic increase in the use
of company Web sites since our 2000 Electronics Release and the adoption

76. Id.
77. Commission Guidance on the Use of Company Web Sites, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-58288, 73 Fed. Reg. 45,862, 45,863 (Aug. 7, 2008), available at
https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2008/34-58288.pdf.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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of Regulation FD.” 81 Therefore, company web sites had become “an
obvious place for investors to find information about the company.” 82 For
this reason, the SEC wanted the new guidelines to “encourage the
continued development of company Web sites as a significant vehicle for
the dissemination to investors of important company information.”83
The openness of this policy went as a far as recognizing that “in very
limited circumstances, a company’s Web site can even serve as a
standalone method of providing information to investors.”84 The SEC’s
new stance on online disclosures represented that “[a] fundamental
principle underlying these interpretations and rules is that, where access is
freely available to all, use of electronic media is at least equal to other
methods of delivering information or making it available to investors and
the market.” 85 Therefore, liberalizing disclosure requirements “allow[ed]
companies to include more ‘interactive’ and current information on their
Web sites than was the case previously.” 86 Such a change would “[move]
Web sites away from the filing cabinet or ‘static’ paradigm to a ‘dynamic’
paradigm, one shaped by the market’s desire for more current, searchable
and interactive information.” 87
B. SEC Trepidation over the Use of New Disclosure Mediums
Despite praising the virtues and opportunities for online disclosure
efforts, the 2008 guidelines also echoed the SEC’s fundamental concerns
about the ways in which liberalizing disclosure practices would
compromise the fairness framework of Reg FD. Within the guidelines, the
SEC reiterated that Reg FD sought to “address the problem of selective
disclosure of material information by companies, in which ‘a privileged
few gain an informational edge––and the ability to use that edge to profit––
from their superior access to corporate insiders . . . .’”88 Gaining
information in this way violated the principle that investment gains should
come from an investor’s own “skill, acumen, or diligence.”89
The theme of fairness is most notable in the SEC’s treatment of when
and how disclosure within online forums would be considered adequately
public for the purposes of Reg FD. The guidelines stressed that great care
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 45,866.
Id. at 45,864.
Id. at 45,862.
Id. at 45,866.
Id. at 45,864.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 45,866.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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must be taken “when providing guidance on when information is
considered public for purposes of assessing whether a subsequent selective
Despite advances in
disclosure may implicate Regulation FD.” 90
technology making it “an appropriate time to provide additional guidance
regarding the public nature of disclosures on company Web sites for
purposes of Regulation FD,” the SEC would not take a position on
“whether and when information on a company’s Web site is considered
public for purposes of determining if a subsequent selective disclosure of
such information may implicate Regulation FD . . . .” 91 Instead, the SEC
placed the burden of interpreting these standards on issuers themselves.
Companies would need to consider whether and when: (1) A company
Web site is a recognized channel of distribution, (2) posting of information
on a company Web site disseminates the information in a manner making it
available to the securities marketplace in general, and (3) there has been a
reasonable waiting period for investors and the market to react to the
posted information. 92
In addition, the decision of “whether a company’s Web site is a
recognized channel of distribution of information” would be dependent “on
the steps that the company has taken to alert the market to its Web site and
its disclosure practices, as well as the use by investors and the market of the
company’s Web site.” 93
III.

A BRAVE NEW WORLD FOR DISCLOSURE: 2013 REG FD
REPORT ON SOCIAL MEDIA USE

The SEC’s most recent set of interpretive guidelines echo a similar
uneasy tension with accepting new communication mediums for disclosure
while promoting Reg FD’s initial framework. Unlike the 2008 guidelines,
the need for the 2013 guidelines became apparent not just by recognizing a
changing communication technology environment. Instead, the SEC’s own
decision to launch a possible enforcement action over Reed Hastings’
Facebook post prompted the Commission to review its policies in light of a
possible disconnect between disclosure policy and acceptable corporate
For this reason, the 2013 guidelines
communication practices.94
approached the current state of fair disclosure practices in two parts.

90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 45,867.
93. Id.
94. SEC Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Exchange Act, supra
note 11, ¶ 84,973.
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A. SEC’s Analysis of the Netflix Controversy
The first half of the new guidelines explained why the SEC had
initially decided to pursue an enforcement action against Netflix. In this
section, the SEC described how its concern with Hastings’ post stemmed
from more than just the content of the post.
The SEC outlined several problematic features of the Hastings post.
First, the SEC argued that the investment community did not have adequate
notice from Netflix that financial information would be posted on Hastings’
Facebook page. 95 In support of its concerns, the SEC identified that
Hastings’ personal Facebook page had not been previously used “to
announce company metrics.” 96 Second, neither Hastings nor Netflix had
followed the post with the kinds of corresponding documentation that are
normally associated with the disclosure of relevant financial information.97
Third, Hastings had not sought out the advice of other company executives
and regulatory officials in the company, such as Netflix’s CFO or the
investor relations department, before posting the content.98 Fourth, Netflix
had not taken any action through its other communication channels to
inform investors that material financial information would be located on
the Facebook page. 99
Compounding these variables were numerous comments by Hastings,
which established the importance of the content contained on his Facebook
profile. The SEC expressed concern that Hastings had previously
described the company’s streaming hours figures as a “milestone” and “a
measure of an engagement and scale in terms of the adoption of our service
and use of our service.” 100 Discussing such a milestone on his personal
Facebook page appeared especially problematic since any previous time
Netflix posted online information, it directed investors to the company’s
social media pages, blog, or web site.101 The consistency of this disclosure
method was substantiated by a December 2012 comment in which Hastings
stated that “we [Netflix] don’t currently use Facebook and other social
media to get material information to investors; we usually get that

95. Id. ¶ 84,975.
96. Id.
97. Id.; see also id. at 84,974 (noting, “Netflix did not file with or furnish to the
Commission a Current Report on Form 8-K, issue a press release through its standard
distribution channels, or otherwise announce the streaming milestone.”).
98. Id. ¶ 84,974.
99. Id. ¶ 84,973 (“The post was not accompanied by a press release, a post on Netflix’s
own web site or Facebook page, or a Form 8-K.”).
100. Id. ¶ 84,974 (internal quotation marks omitted).
101. Id.
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information out in our extensive investor letters, press releases and SEC
filings.” 102
The disconnect between Netflix’s past disclosure habits and Hastings’
post raised red flags about the acceptability of the post. However, the SEC
also expressed significant concern about the speed with which the post had
been shared it’s impact on the financial markets. Even though Netflix had
not announced the milestone streaming numbers through any other
conventional disclosure channel, it took only two hours for a technologyfocused blog and several news outlets to pick up the story. 103
Unsurprisingly, the financial press also began reporting the news shortly
after the closing of markets on the release date, and analysts reacted
positively to the news. 104 Much to the concern of the SEC, Netflix’s stock
price rose from $70.45 on the day after the post to $81.72 on the following
day. 105
B. Addressing Social Media Disclosure Concerns
While the first half of the SEC’s report chastised Hastings and Netflix
for their social media disclosure practices, the Commission recognized that
the Hastings situation created “uncertainty concerning how Regulation FD
and the Commission’s 2008 Guidance apply to disclosures made through
social media channels.” 106 The uncertainty required the Commission to
address two questions: (1) how should current Reg FD policies be applied
to Hastings’ Facebook post, and (2) how should the Commission’s 2008
guidelines be applied to “emerging technologies,” including social media
platforms? 107
In theory, the Report was not “aimed at inhibiting corporate
communication through evolving social media channels.”108 For that
reason, the SEC did “not wish to inhibit the content, form, or forum of any
such disclosure” and was “mindful of placing additional compliance
burdens on issuers.” 109 Therefore, the guidelines sought to serve as an
acknowledgment that companies “are increasingly using social media to
communicate with shareholders and the market generally.” 110 The SEC
appreciated “the value and prevalence of social media channels in
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. ¶ 84,975 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 84,973.
Id.
Id. ¶ 84,976.
Id. ¶ 84,975.
Id. ¶ 84,973.

POLIT_FINAL (ARTICLE 6) .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

634

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

3/26/2015 5:45 PM

[Vol. 17:2

contemporary market communications” and wanted to use the Report to
support “companies seeking new ways to communicate and engage with
shareholders and the market.” 111
Despite this seeming embrace of social media in the disclosure
context, the SEC exhibited significant discomfort with allowing executives,
such as Hastings, to post material financial information on social media. 112
To interpret the acceptability of company and executive social media
disclosure, the SEC relied on its 2008 guidelines as “a relevant framework
for applying Regulation FD to evolving social media channels of
distribution.” 113 Such an analogy seemed relevant because company use of
social media channels is “not fundamentally different from the ways in
which the web sites, blogs, and RSS feeds addressed by the 2008 Guidance
are used.” 114
The SEC reiterated, “[t]he 2008 Guidance, furthermore, specifically
identified ‘push’ technologies, such as email alerts and RSS feeds and
‘interactive’ communication tools, such as blogs, which could enable the
automatic electronic dissemination of information to subscribers.” 115 For
that reason, the SEC viewed “[t]oday’s evolving social media channels” as
“an extension of these concepts, whereby information can be disseminated
to those with access.” 116 Therefore, corporate social media pages could be
analogized to web sites that are “created, populated, and updated by the
issuer.” 117
Despite viewing the 2008 guidelines as a touchstone for accepting
disclosure through company social media accounts, the Report took a less
favorable view towards disclosure through personal accounts. For
example, the SEC explained that “[p]ersonal social media sites of
individuals employed by a public company would not ordinarily be
assumed to be channels through which the company would disclose
material corporate information.”118
C. Tension over the Fairness of Social Media Disclosures
Despite finding precedent for social media disclosure in its past
guidelines, the SEC did not seem to fully embrace such a change. Once
again, the burden of fairness fell on the issuers. In the SEC’s view, the
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. ¶ 84,976.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 84,973.
Id. ¶ 84,976.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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most important consideration continued to be “that widespread access to
company information is a key component of our integrated disclosure
scheme, the efficient functioning of the markets, and investor
protection.” 119 The SEC expected issuers to “examine rigorously the
factors indicating whether a particular channel is a ‘recognized channel of
distribution’ for communicating with their investors.” 120 Therefore,
“identifying the specific social media channels a company intends to use
for the dissemination of material non-public information” is an invaluable
aspect of providing these groups with “the opportunity to take the steps
necessary to be in a position to receive important disclosures––e.g.,
subscribing, joining, registering, or reviewing that particular channel.”121
The SEC took the position that “[w]ithout such notice, the investing public
would be forced to keep pace with a changing and expanding universe of
potential disclosure channels, a virtually impossible task.” 122 Thus, the
SEC sought to “caution issuers that a deviation from their usual practices
for making public disclosure may affect [their] judgment as to whether the
method they have chosen in a particular case was reasonable.”123
IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE EVOLUTION OF REG FD STANDARDS

While the SEC has framed its social media guidance as “flexible
enough to address questions that arise for companies that choose to
communicate through social media,” it may indirectly have a far greater
impact on the future of disclosure practices.124 However, understanding
these future implications requires an analysis of how past guidelines have
changed the SEC’s view of the meaning of fair disclosure.
A review of the purpose and function of Reg FD illustrates the
challenge of regulating fairness in an increasingly complicated information
marketplace. The proposed purpose of Reg FD and its initial standards
show a strong tendency towards equating fairness with access. The
adoption of Reg FD was motivated by the concern that selective disclosure

119. Id. ¶ 84,974 (quoting Guidance on the Use of Company Web Sites, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-58288, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,829, 73 Fed. Reg. 45,862,
45,863 (Aug. 7, 2008)).
120. Id. ¶ 84,976.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. ¶ 84,973 (citing Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading Rule, 17 C.F.R. §
243.100 (2011)).
124. Press Release, Sec. & Exchange Comm’n, SEC Says Social Media OK for
Company Announcements if Investors are Alerted, (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/
News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171513574#.Uyt6TvldXAI.
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practices restricted public access to relevant financial information.125
Making fairness synonymous with access logically flowed from an
information marketplace in the late 1990s and early 2000s in which the
exchange of material information occurred through interpersonal means or
closely held conference calls. The only way to ensure that investors could
fully join the “neighborhood” was to provide them with equal access to this
material financial information.
While the SEC’s initial guidelines focused on this relationship,
evolving communication technologies have slowly eroded the overall
importance of access. From Reg FD’s early adoption, SEC leadership
recognized that the growth of the Internet would inevitably lead to
consumers having increased access to financial information. 126 For that
reason, it was not a stretch for the SEC to accept disclosures via company
web sites. Such web sites represented the Internet face of companies and
provided all investors with the ability to view and access material financial
information.
However, the 2013 social media guidelines represented a significant
departure from the fairness/access relationship. The growth of social media
use by companies has arguably provided investors with unprecedented
access to financial information. Instead of having to check company web
sites periodically, investors can now choose the kind of information they
want to receive and access it in real time. If the SEC still viewed
accessibility of information as the most important component of fair
disclosure, Hastings’ post would have been less likely to attract attention.
Any individual could access the posted content and 200,000 people had
received it. This access-focused view of disclosure is likely why Hastings
expressed frustration that the SEC would deem such a post insufficiently
public to satisfy disclosure requirements.
The SEC’s new guidelines presented not just an opportunity to address
the social media question, but also signaled a shift away from viewing fair
disclosure as a matter of providing access. Instead, the SEC’s stance on
social media can be viewed as a growing concern that fairness must now be
evaluated through the lens of notice. There are several reasons to support
such a view. First, the 2008 guidelines presented the underpinnings of a
notice-based view of fair disclosure. Within the 2008 guidelines, the SEC
justified its acceptance of disclosure via company web sites by explaining
that investors had begun to accept company web sites as reasonable sources
for company-related disclosures. 127 Web site disclosures allowed investors
to have widespread access to financial information. Notice in the context
125.
126.
127.

See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
See supra Section I.E.
See supra Section II.A.
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of web sites was not a concern because these sites were already where
investors reasonably believed that they could acquire such knowledge. 128
Similarly, social media disclosures present investors with even greater
access to relevant information. Investors now have the ability to choose
how and where they would like to receive that information, thus solving the
access problem. However, social media disclosures, unlike company web
site disclosures, presented notice issues because investors would be less
likely to view these platforms as the go-to source for financial information.
For example, Lynn Turner, former SEC Chief Accountant, claimed that the
SEC’s social media decision should be considered “bad policy” because
“[m]any investors, especially those over 50, who in the aggregate have the
most invested, still do not use social media.” 129 Therefore, unsurprisingly,
the new guidelines allow for social media disclosures only if investors have
notice that social media is where material information will be posted. 130
George Canellos, acting director of the SEC’s enforcement division at the
time Report had been published, explained that “[m]ost social media are
perfectly suitable methods for communicating with investors, but not if the
access is restricted or if investors don’t know that’s where they need to turn
to get the latest news.” 131 These concerns over notice can also explain the
SEC’s reluctance to endorse social media disclosures via the personal
Facebook accounts of company executives.132
A. Possible Shift in Culpability Standards
Interestingly, the SEC’s paradigmatic shift towards a notice-based
view of fair disclosure has also been met with a different view of the
culpability standard for enforcement actions. Even though the SEC did not
decide to issue an enforcement action against Netflix or Hastings, the very
threat of such an action seems to be a strong departure from the SEC’s
initial conception of when an enforcement action would be acceptable. The
early comments from SEC leadership at the time of Reg FD’s adoption
appeared to allay the fears of companies by embracing a “benefit of the

128. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (citing the SEC’s interpretive release
regarding the use of company websites, which noted that company websites had become
“an obvious place for investors to find information about the company.”).
129. Gallu, supra note 13.
130. See supra Section III.C.
131. Nikhil Kumar, Company Results. . . you can now hear them first on Twitter,
LONDON EVENING STANDARD (Apr. 3, 2013), available at http://www.standard.co.uk/
business/business-news/company-results-you-can-now-hear-them-first-on-twitter8558210.html.
132. See supra Section III.B.
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doubt” approach to disclosure problems. 133 Possible Reg FD enforcement
actions would only arise from gross deviation from the normal standard of
care. 134
The threatened investigation over the Hastings post once again
indicates that the SEC may be more focused on notice rather than access as
a signal that a deviation from these standards has occurred. The possibility
of an enforcement action indicates perhaps two different views on the
future of Reg FD enforcement. One view is that the SEC has lowered the
culpability standard to one that places greater responsibility upon issuers to
ensure that information shared on social media pages is compliant with Reg
FD guidelines. Such a view would be consistent with the SEC’s past
emphasis on increased issuer responsibility in the disclosure context.
The second, and perhaps more compelling view, is that shifting the
fairness paradigm towards notice allows the SEC to more effectively
protect investors against pseudo-disclosure efforts by companies. In the
social media space, it is particularly easy for companies, such as Netflix, to
argue that its post is “public” enough to satisfy an access-based view of
adequate disclosure. Since most companies communicate with investors
across a wide variety of online platforms, it is easy to argue against an
accusation of bad faith. The very existence of these communication
platforms symbolically supports a company’s view that it actively promotes
the free flow of information with its investors.
In contrast, a notice-based system significantly raises the bar for
compliance. Companies would have to adopt more formal policies to
ensure its social media platforms are synchronized with more traditional
disclosure locations, such as company web sites. The SEC’s apparent
dismay that neither Hastings nor Netflix had displayed the content of the
Facebook post on one of the more traditional disclosure platforms supports
synchronization. The SEC’s focus on the location of the content, as much
as the content itself, illustrates a belief that social media disclosures can be
acceptable but will likely raise regulatory red flags if they are the only
mechanism used.
B. Creation of New Chilling Effects
Unfortunately, the SEC’s shift towards equating fairness with
adequacy of notice may produce the exact kind of chilling effect that had
concerned early Reg FD opponents.
In today’s communication
133. See supra text accompanying notes 48-59 (noting the SEC’s response to comments,
which included a statement that Reg FD was not “a trap for the unwary” and addressing
concerns about the possible “chilling effects” of Reg FD).
134. Id.
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marketplace, providing access is a low threshold. There is already a
widespread understanding that the growth and proliferation of social media
outlets have meant that companies cannot hide in the shadows. Gone are
the times when companies could actively, and rather openly, share
information with only a select few. Now the expectation is that companies
operate and effectively use a variety of online communication platforms.
For that reason, providing access to company information has become an
institutionalized norm rather than a sign of good corporate citizenship.
Even though the emergence of new communication platforms has
advanced Reg FD’s concern about access, it also creates new challenges in
the sphere of notice. When Reg FD was first adopted, the SEC leadership
conceptualized the investment public as being encompassed by one
“neighborhood.” 135 Therefore, it logically flowed that the issuers within
this neighborhood had the obligation to ensure that investors had the tools
and knowledge to adequately participate in the markets. However, the
growth of more tailored communication channels puts the applicability of a
universal neighborhood concept in question.
The emergence of new communication channels have resulted in
many of Commissioner Unger’s prophecies coming to life.136 Investors
now have more access to financial information than ever before.
Fortunately, the ability of investors to choose the communication channels
they wish to use, and the sources from which that information will come,
solves Commissioner Unger’s problem of information inundation. This has
resulted in a shift where investors, rather than issuers, now have a
significant ability to dictate what disclosed information is relevant. The
fact that 200,000 people decided to follow one particular executive 137 is a
strong indication that investors are now much savvier about where they
believe relevant financial information will be located.
Unfortunately, with great opportunities come great challenges. The
SEC’s new emphasis on notice is problematic because the new guidelines
paint social media outlets with a very broad brush. Unlike company web
sites, social media platforms display and share information in a diversity of
ways. How does one compare disclosure via a 140 character tweet versus
disclosure through a Pinterest picture? 138

135. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30 (describing the SEC’s “neighborhood”
concept).
136. See supra text accompanying notes 70-75 (discussing Unger’s views on emerging
communication technology’s future effects on the information marketplace).
137. See Isidore & Goldman, supra note 5 (noting that “Hastings currently has 245,000
Facebook subscribers on his account.”).
138. Wansor, supra note 21, at 751 (“Although the SEC has expressly permitted the use
of Facebook and Twitter, what about the other social media channels?”).
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Employing a one-size-fits-all approach to social media disclosure
makes dealing with these diverse platforms a herculean task. For example,
if a company operates numerous online platforms, must it use every
channel to put investors on notice about relevant information?
Unfortunately, applying a universal view of notice to a diverse set of
online platforms may result in social media only being useful to provide
notice that financial information is located on a more conventional
disclosure channel. Such a use for social media would be a waste because
it only shifts the way investors gain notice about information rather than
the way they receive, consume, and use such information.
C. Stunting the Furtherance of the Social CEO
Unfortunately, the new SEC guidelines may also have a chilling effect
on one of the most promising opportunities presented by the acceptance of
social media disclosure. Unlike at the time of Reg FD’s adoption,
executives now have more opportunities to connect with investors on a
broad and consistent scale. However, the new SEC guidelines seem to chill
such communication efforts by promoting company social media pages139
as the superior avenue compared with executive pages.
The SEC’s preference for company social media accounts ignores how
rapid changes in communication mediums have fundamentally altered the
way executives communicate and interact with Main Street.
Unsurprisingly, the 2008 financial crisis has significantly damaged the
American public’s perception of executives. 140 While overall trust in CEOs
has been on the rise, there are signals that those trends may not be
continuing. 141 However, the emergence of the “Social CEO” concept has
shown strong connection between trust and engagement. A survey
evaluating the impact of executive social media use found that 80.6% of
respondents believed that CEO social media use is a very or somewhat
important tool for engaging customers and investors. 142 Unsurprisingly,
139. See supra text accompanying note 117 (noting the SEC’s endorsement of corporate
social media pages).
140. See S.D. “Shibu” Shibulal, Infosys CEO: How to lead in a Post-Financial Crisis,
FORTUNE (June 20, 2014, 9:16AM), http://fortune.com/2014/06/20/infosys-ceo-how-to-leadin-a-post-financial-crisis-era/ (stating, “The events that led to the recent global economic
crisis made it widely acknowledged as the crisis of trust.”).
141. See EDELMAN, 2014 EDELMAN TRUST BAROMETER EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 6 fig. 12
(2014), available at http://www.edelman.com/insights/intellectual-property/2014-edelmantrust-barometer/ about-trust/executive-summary/ (explaining that trust in CEOs has risen
12% from 2009 to 2014. Despite these gains, trust in executives remained stagnant from last
year).
142. BRANDFOG, 2013 CEO, SOCIAL MEDIA, & LEADERSHIP SURVEY 1 (2013), available
at http://www.brandfog.com/CEOSocialMediaSurvey/BRANDfog_2013_CEO_Survey.pdf.
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CEOs who do not actively disclose financial information via their social
media accounts may be construed as actually hiding information. 143 When
it comes to building trust, it appears that the medium is just as, if not more,
important than the message itself.
Despite the clear benefits arising from social media use, executives
have still shown a relative reluctance to embrace such platforms. For
example, a survey of 130 company executives found that 48% did not
engage with their company’s social media strategy or even know any
details about such plans. 144 Numerous forces have previously prompted
this chilling effect. These variables include, but are not limited to,
unfamiliarity with social media platforms and/or a reluctance or fear of
repercussions surrounding misuse. 145 Such concerns are not unfounded.
For example, Gene Morphis, the former CFO of Francesca’s, was fired
after tweeting about a board meeting on his private social media account. 146
Even though Morphis only had 234 Twitter followers, the possibility of the
SEC interpreting his tweet as an attempt to share insider information
prompted Francesca’s to terminate his employment. 147 Stories such as
these, in addition to the Hastings controversy, may further breed a
mentality that the possibility of placing oneself or one’s company in the
regulatory cross-hairs may be enough to deter social media use all together.
Chilling social media disclosures by executives is an indirect harm of
the new guidelines that should not be overlooked. Some commentators
have argued that one of the more significant aspects of the SEC’s new
disclosure requirements is that it “further validates an executive’s role in
social media engagement.” 148 By allowing for the possibility of executive
disclosure, the SEC can be perceived as giving validity to the widespread
belief in the social media world that the use of these communication tools
should be a top-down endeavor. 149
Promoting a top-down approach advances the mission of Reg FD by
employing a proven method of promoting trust and transparency in the
143. Jason Ouellette, Should companies begin to use social media to disseminate
financial data, PR WEEK US (June 1, 2013), http://www.prweek.com/article/1275624/
companies-begin-use-social-media-disseminate-financial-data.
144. Laura Montini, Survey: Executives Have No Idea What’s Going on With Social
Media, INC. (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.inc.com/laura-montini/executive-social-mediainvolvement.html.
145. Evan LePage, What the SEC’s Social Media Decision Means for Enterprises,
HOOTSUITE BLOG (April 4, 2013), http://blog.hootsuite.com/secs-social-decision-means/.
146. Ryan Holmes, Social Media Compliance Isn’t Fun, But It’s Necessary, HARVARD
BUSINESS REVIEW BLOG (Aug. 23, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://blogs.hbr.org/2012/08/socialmedia-compliance-isnt/.
147. Id.
148. LePage, supra note 145.
149. Montini, supra note 144.
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investment community. One of Chairman Levitt’s central tenets for Reg
FD had been the belief that the health of US financial markets is tied to a
perception of transparency. 150 While the 2008 financial crisis came with
many stories of executive actions undermining confidence in U.S. markets,
individuals in similar roles may play an equally important role in the
rebuilding process. Encouraging executive social media use in the
disclosure context supports Chairman Levitt’s vision because it presents
“an easy way to reassure that the information is accurate and important.” 151
The decision whether to use personal social media accounts for
disclosure purposes illustrates a fringe challenge of an evolving conception
of fairness. While thought leaders, such as Commissioner Unger,
recognized that Reg FD would need to adapt with changes in
communication technology, 152 there had been less emphasis on how
changes in technology would alter the relationship between the actors
involved in disclosure. It is not surprising that as investors have evolved
and adapted, the issuers themselves have concurrently changed. Therefore,
the future of fairness must not just hinge on changing mediums, but
changing relationships as well.
CONCLUSION
The initial premise of Reg FD has helped to promote increased
fairness in the financial markets. However, the current information
marketplace makes preserving these central pillars an increasingly
challenging task. The world of conference calls to investors has been
replaced by one where companies have more opportunities to communicate
with more people in more ways than any time in history. Communicating
in such a way is no longer a privilege enjoyed by large public companies
and institutional investors; rather it has become an expectation by
consumers. Understanding the SEC’s past concerns over fair disclosure
and the ideological shift in its guidelines help to inform how history will
impact the future of disclosure practices.

150. See text accompanying notes 24-27 (noting that Chairman Levitt considered
transparency as a bedrock principle of the securities markets).
151. LePage, supra note 145.
152. See supra Section I.E (detailing Commissioner Unger’s views).

